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Financing Health Care 
Expenditure in the OECD 
Countries: Evidence from a 
Heterogeneous, Cross-Sectional 
Dependent Panel 
 
Summary: This paper analyses the relationship between health expenditure
and the way it is financed in a panel of 30 OECD countries observed annually
from 1990 to 2009. The nonstationarity and cointegration properties between
health care spending and its sources of funding, income, and non-income 
variables are studied. This is performed in a panel data context controlling for
both cross section dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. The findings
suggest that when health care expenditure is mainly financed by government it 
becomes independent of an individual’s income, controlling for dependency
rates for old and young age structure and technological progress.
Key words: Health expenditure, Drivers of health expenditure, Panel unit root 
tests, Panel cointegration, Cross section dependence model. 
JEL: C33, H51, I10.
 
 
 
Despite years of concern and attempts to contain costs, health spending per person in 
real terms increased on average around 4.0% per year between 1990 and 2009, ac-
cording to the latest data from the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development - OECD 2011). In almost all countries, public expenditure ac-
counts for the majority of health care spending. It has increased from an average of 
12% of total government spending in 1990 to a record of 16% in 2010. OECD has 
cited technological change, population expectations, and ageing populations as the 
main drivers of the rise of health care expenditure. 
Using annual data on 30 OECD countries from 1990 to 2009, we investigate 
the non stationarity and cointegration properties between health care spending and a 
set of regressors including the shares of health care expenditure financed privately 
and by the government, medication, income per capita, and the dependency rates for 
old and young age structures. We also study the relationship between technological 
progress and health care expenditure using infant mortality as a proxy for changes in 
medical care technology. The dynamics of health expenditure and this set of regres-
sors (as well as their relationship) are investigated by estimating a heterogenous pan-
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el model with cross-sectional correlated errors. A factor structure is included in the 
econometric specification with the intent to synthesize the effects of shocks that may 
hit health spending such as advances in medical care technology, policy shifts, new 
diseases, and shifts in preferences and expectations of users of health services. The 
factor structure can capture any contemporaneous correlation that arises from the 
common response of countries to such unanticipated events.  
This paper contributes to the literature on the determinants of health care ex-
penditure in several ways. Firstly, we extend the sample to cover the recent period. 
Secondly, we account for the way health care expenditure is financed, i.e. by the 
government or privately, and we examine expenditures on medications. We also ac-
count for the fact that health care expenditures are driven not only by income but also 
by technological progress and by dependency rates of the population. Finally, the 
empirical methods applied are more comprehensive and recent developments in the 
field of panel cointegration are taken into account. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews related 
literatures. In Section 2, an empirical model specification is presented and the time 
series properties of the data analysed through several panel data unit root tests. Sec-
tion 3 provides the empirical results for panel cointegration tests. Section 4 discusses 
the long-run relationship, and Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. Related Literature 
 
Empirical research on the causes for the increase of health care expenditures indi-
cates that income is one of the most important drivers of health expenditures. Joseph 
P. Newhouse (1977), Jennifer Roberts (1999), Ulf-G Gerdtham and Mickael 
Löthgren (2002), Albert A. Okunade and Vasudeva N. R. Murthy (2002), and Do-
nald G. Freeman (2003) have found an income elasticity greater than 1, indicating 
that health care is a luxury good, while Åke G. Blomqvist and Richard A. L. Carter 
(1997), and Badi H. Baltagi and Francesco Moscone (2010) have estimated an in-
come elasticity less than 1, interpreting health care as a necessity. The discussion 
over health being a luxury versus a necessity good has important policy implications, 
because if health is a necessity it should be the object of public intervention and pub-
lic funding (Anthony J. Culyer 1988; Livio Di-Matteo 2003). This debate receives 
additional attention with the pressure for the reduction of government budget and for 
guaranteeing debt sustainability (Roel van Elk, Esther Mot, and Philip H. Franses 
2009). 
Newhouse (1977) regressed per capita medical expenditures on GDP per ca-
pita for 13 countries for 1970 and found income elasticity for health care spending 
greater than 1, ranging from 1.15 to 1.31, and concluded that medical care was a lux-
ury good. Gerdtham et al. (1992) used a single cross section of 19 OECD countries in 
1987 and reported per capita income, urbanization, and the share of public financing 
to total health expenditure as positive and significant variables with the income elas-
ticity reported at 1.33. Gerdtham et al. (1998) used a pooled time-series cross section 
analysis for 22 countries over the period 1970-1991 and found the income elasticity 
of health expenditure to be around 0.8. In a national-level regional study Di-Matteo 
and Rosanna Di-Matteo (1998) used a pooled time-series cross section approach to 
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estimate and examine the determinants of Canadian provincial government health 
spending over the period 1965-1991. Their results show that the estimated income 
elasticity of real per capita provincial government health care expenditures is 0.77, 
suggesting that over this time period provincial government health expenditures were 
not a luxury good. More recently, Van Elk, Mot, and Franses (2009) found that in-
come is an important driver of health care expenditures for some European countries. 
The income elasticity took values of 0.93 and 0.96 for the periods 1970-2003 and 
1980-2003, respectively. 
The large values obtained for the income elasticity in the macro studies do not 
find support in the micro evidence. At a micro level, the income elasticity seems to 
be less than 1 (Gerdtham and Bengt Jönsson 1992; Moscone and Elisa Tosetti 2010). 
As stated by Thomas E. Getzen (2000), health care is an individual necessity and a 
national luxury. At the individual level, the existence of health insurance makes the 
demand for health care independent to a large extent of an individual’s income, 
which means that demand is highly inelastic. At the aggregate level, the situation is 
different since health care spending depends mainly on the level and composition of 
government expenditure, which evolves with income (Kamil Dybczak and Bartosz 
Przywara 2010). 
More recently, several empirical studies pointed to the possible non-
stationarity properties of health care spending and income data, which in turn cast 
doubt on earlier inference on income elasticity obtained from spurious regressions 
(Paul Hansen and Alan King 1996). Todd Jewell et al. (2003), and Josep Lluís Car-
rion-i-Silvestre (2005) find smaller values for the income elasticity after the introduc-
tion of a time trend. Recent literature investigates the non-stationarity in health ex-
penditure and income and their long-run relationship in a panel data framework (Ro-
berts 1999; Gerdtham and Löthgren 2002; Freeman 2003; Jewell et al. 2003; Oku-
nade, Mustafa C. Karakus, and Charles Okeke 2004; Carrion-i-Silvestre 2005; Chris-
tian Dreger and Hans-Eggert Reimers 2005; Baltagi and Moscone 2010; Moscone 
and Tosetti 2010).  
Besides income variables, a number of non-income determinants of health 
care spending have been identified in the literature as important factors in explaining 
variations of health care expenditure across countries. Evidence indicates that when 
government expenditure on health, the age structure of the population, and technolo-
gical progress have been included, the income elasticity is found to be less than 1 
(Van Elk, Mot, and Franses 2009). 
Technological progress has been proxied by several variables such as time 
trend, life expectancy, infant mortality, the surgical procedures (Thomas P. Weil 
1995), the amount of specific medical equipment (Laurence C. Baker and Susan K. 
Wheeler 2000), or the number of tomographic scanners (Terkel Christiansen et al. 
2006). Newhouse (1992) found that technology accounted for as much as 75% of the 
increase in health care expenditure. A common finding in these studies is that the 
trend is positive (Joan O’Connell 1996; Ruolz Ariste and Jeff Carr 2003; Freeman 
2003), an outcome that is seen as an indicator of the cost-increasing effect of tech-
nology (Dreger and Reimers 2005; Van Elk, Mot, and Franses 2009). Gerdtham et al. 
(1998) included the number of renal dialyses per million of the population as a proxy 
for technology and found a positive and significant effect for this variable. Generally, 
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when including a proxy for technological progress, the income elasticities are found 
to be less than 1. However, Roberts (1999), and Okunade and Murthy (2002) found 
income elasticity greater than 1. 
The share of the young population (usually, population under 15 years old, or 
even under 5) and the share of the elderly (above 65) or very old population (above 
75) have been used to characterize the dependency rates of the populations. The indi-
cator that has been receiving attention is ageing, but the estimated coefficient has 
been weak (Michael Grossman 1972; Robert E. Leu 1986; Pierre Moise and 
Stéphane Jacobzone 1986; Jeff Richardson and Iain Robertson 1986; Culyer 1988, 
1990; Gerdtham et al. 1992; Theo Hitiris and John Posnett 1992; Di-Matteo and Di-
Matteo 1998; Gerdtham et al. 1998; Peter Zweifel, Stefan Felder, and Markus Meiers 
1999; Gerdtham and Jönsson 2000; Jönsson and Ingemar Eckerlund 2003). However, 
more recent studies have found a significant and positive effect of ageing on health 
care expenditures (Murthy and Victor Ukpolo 1994; O’Connell 1996; Okunade, 
Mustafa, and Okeke 2004; Dreger and Reimers 2005; Christiansen et al. 2006). This 
finding is based on the tendency for health expenditures per capita to increase with 
age (Joaquim Oliveira Martins and Christine de la Maisonneuve 2006; Kosta Josifi-
dis et al. 2011). 
Institutional factors are also pointed to as drivers of health expenditure (Gerd-
tham et al. 1992; Murthy and Ukpolo 1994; O’Connell 1996; Gerdtham et al. 1998; 
Roberts 1999; Okunade, Mustafa, and Okeke 2004). Conversely, Pedro P. Barros 
(1998) finds no significant results between institutional factors and health expendi-
ture. Institutional factors are sometimes proxied by the share of public financing in 
health care (Van Elk, Mot, and Franses 2009). This variable, jointly with the extent 
to which health care expenditure is privately financed, has been considered in estima-
tions of health care expenditures (Jesús Clemente, Carmen Marcuello, and Antonio 
Montañés 2008). The extent to which health care expenditure is financed by the gov-
ernment leads political factors to play an important role in explaining health care ex-
penditures (Nicole Attia and Valérie Bérenger 2007, 2009; Niklas Potrafke 2010; 
Josifidis et al. 2011). Leu (1986), Culyer (1988), and Theo Hitiris and John Posnett 
(1992) claim that it has a positive effect on health care spending, while Okunade, 
Mustafa, and Okeke (2004), and Moscone and Tosetti (2010) find a negative effect 
on health expenditure. 
Private health care financing has been analysed through health insurance va-
riables. Cameron et al. (1988) found a strong and positive impact of different health 
insurance coverage on the demand for health services. Many forms of private ex-
penditure on longevity are determined positively and negatively by public expendi-
ture decisions (Scherer and Devaux 2010), and as a consequence, it is necessary to 
analyse private and public components of expenditure separately. A special form of 
health expenditures is pharmaceutical expenditures, which have been identified as an 
important determinant of health care outcomes (Pierre-Yves Crémieux et al. 2005a, 
b; Emmaneul G. Guindon and Paul Contoyannis 2008). 
From microeconomic theory, the relative price of health has been identified as 
another driver of health care expenditure. According to William J. Baumol (1967), 
the health sector has lower productivity than other sectors, which keeps relative pric-
es of health higher. Jochen Hartwig (2008), Marc Pomp and Sunčica Vujić (2008), 
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and Van Elk, Mot, and Franses (2009) report a positive effect for the so-called Bau-
mol effect, i.e. an increase in price decreases volume and increases in real health care 
expenditure in the long run. However, Gerdtham et al. (1992) find a not significant 
effect for the relative price of health. 
Reactions to external events as well as spatial spillovers are expected to in-
duce a structure of correlation in health expenditure data. When data contain cross-
section dependence, conventional estimators such as ordinary least squares (OLS) are 
inefficient and the estimated standard errors are biased (Donald W. K. Andrews 
2005). Jewell et al. (2003) introduce time-specific effects in the econometric specifi-
cation to control for contemporaneous correlation. Nevertheless, the inclusion of 
time-specific effects implies that the common shocks have identical influences on 
each unit, an assumption that might be quite restrictive in empirical analysis. Other 
studies build the empirical distribution of unit root test statistics by bootstrap tech-
niques (Freeman 2003; Carrion-i-Silvestre 2005). However, the bootstrap procedure 
is subject to size distortions in finite samples, especially in cases where N is small 
relative to T, as in the study of health expenditure in the OECD countries (Gangad-
harrao S. Maddala and Shaowen Wu 1999; Vanessa L. Smith et al. 2007). Few works 
on health expenditure explicitly account for cross-section dependence when studying 
its long-run economic relationships (Baltagi and Moscone 2010; Moscone and Toset-
ti 2010). 
In this paper we consider that health expenditures per capita are explained by 
different sources of health expenditure funding: public, private and expenditures on 
medicines, income per capita, and the dependency rates of the population and tech-
nological progress. We also consider the effects of shocks that may hit health spend-
ing, such as advances in medical care technology, policy shifts, new diseases, and 
shifts in preferences and expectations of users of health services. With this intent we 
follow closely Mohammad H. Pesaran (2004, 2006), including a factor structure in 
the econometric specification. The factor structure can capture any contemporaneous 
correlation that arises from the common response of countries to such unanticipated 
events. Recent literature has recognized that cross section dependence is an important 
characteristic of health data, and has tried to incorporate it (Freeman 2003; Jewell et 
al. 2003; Carrion-i-Silvestre 2005; Baltagi and Moscone 2010; Moscone and Tosetti 
2010). According to Moscone and Tosetti (2010) when the existence of global and 
local forms of cross-section dependence in health spending and income is not taken 
into account in the study of health expenditure, it is likely to provide policy makers 
with misleading results. 
 
2. Model Specification and Time Series Analysis 
 
The empirical model that motivates our research of the determinants of health ex-
penditures is the following linear heterogeneous panel framework: 
 
ܪ௜௧ = ߚ௜′ ௜ܺ௧ + ݑ௜௧ (1)
 
 
where ൜ i = 1, 2,…, 30 denotes countries;      t = 1, …, 20 denotes periods ሺyearsሻ. 
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In Equation (1), ܪ௜௧, real per capita health care expenditure in the ith country 
at time t, health care expenditure is estimated against the way it is financed, i.e. by 
government (ܪ௉௎), privately (ܪ௉ோ), and expenditures in medications (ܪ௉ு). These 
expenditures were computed over total health care expenditure. The set of regressors 
also includes income per capita (ܻ), and the dependency rates for old (ܦܴ଺ହ) and 
young (ܦܴଵହ) age structure. We also study the relationship between technological 
progress and health care expenditure using infant mortality (ܫܯ) as a proxy for 
changes in medical care technology. All variables are expressed in natural logarithms 
and description of all data and data sources is provided in Appendix. 
The three-way error component term of Equation (1) is given by: 
 
ݑ௜௧ = ߣ௧ + ߟ௜ + ߛ௜′ܥ௧ + ߝ௜௧ (2)
 
where ߣ௧ accounts for time-specific effects and ߟ௜ accounts for unobservable coun-
try-specific effects. The term ߝ௜௧ is the random disturbance in the regression, varying 
across time and country cells. We may also have a third error component, ܥ௧, that 
accounts for unobserved common effects. From Equation (2), correlation arises be-
cause the responses to common external forces or perturbations are similar, though 
not identical, across countries. Notice that common factors induce a correlation be-
tween pairs of statistical units that does not depend on how close they are in the geo-
graphical space. In Model (1), we allow ௜ܺ௧ to be correlated with the unobserved ef-
fects, ܥ௧. Therefore, common factors can impact health expenditure not only directly 
via the factor structure (2), but also indirectly by affecting the regressors. We esti-
mate the parameters ߚ௜ in Model (1) applying the Common Correlated Effects (CCE) 
method developed by Pesaran (2006): 
 
ܪ௜௧ = ߣ௧ + ߟ௜ + ߚ௜′ ௜ܺ௧ + ߨ௜′ ഥ߱௧ + ߥ௜௧ (3)
 
where ഥ߱௧ = ൫ܪഥ௧, തܺ௧′ ൯, with ܪഥ௧ being the cross section average of the dependent vari-
able and തܺ௧′  the cross section average of the regressors. Here, heterogeneity is cap-
tured by the individual specific fixed effects, ߟ௜, the time dummies, ߣ௧, and the load-
ings, ߨ௜. In our analysis we will compute the CCE-Pesaran Pooled Estimator (CCE-
PPE) for the average of the coefficients (Pesaran 2006). Performing Monte Carlo 
experiments, Pesaran and Tosetti (2009) showed that this estimator has good small 
sample properties when the errors follow either a pure factor structure, a pure spatial 
process, or a linear combination of them. 
 
2.1 Time Series Properties of the Data 
 
We use annual data on 30 OECD countries from 1990 to 2009 gathered from the 
OECD Health Dataset. To measure health expenditures per capita and income per 
capita, we used per capita total health care expenditure and per capita income esti-
mated in GDP purchasing power parity, and expressed in US Dollars. We used the 
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population aged over 65 years old and under 15 years old to proxy the dependency 
rates of the population. Infant mortality rate is used to measure technological 
progress. The different sources of health expenditure funding: public, private, and 
expenditures on medication are computed as government expenditure over total 
health care expenditure; out of pocket expenditure on health over total health care 
expenditure; and expenses on medication over total health care expenditure, respec-
tively. 
Since the appropriateness of the cointegration analysis depends on all series 
being integrated of order one, the time series properties of the data must be ascer-
tained before any estimation is carried out. There are several statistics that may be 
used to test for a unit root in panel data, but since our panel data set is not too long, 
we use the Kyung So Im, Pesaran, and Yongcheol Shin (2003) test (IPS). In contrast 
to the Andrew Levin, Chien-Fu Lin, and Chia-Shang J. Chu (2002) test, the IPS’s t-
bar statistic is based on the mean Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics and 
is calculated independently for each cross section of the panel. Based on Monte Carlo 
experiment results, IPS demonstrate that their test has more favorable finite sample 
properties than the LL test. 
Table 1 reports the test results based on the inclusion of an intercept and trend. 
In every case the null that every variable contains a unit root for the series in logs is 
not rejected. Although not shown here, unit root tests on the first differences suggest 
that all variables are stationary in first differences. 
 
Table 1  Panel Unit Root Tests 
 
Series in log-levels         H Y DR65 DR15 IM HPH HPR HPU 
IPS test -2.22 -2.30 -1.06 -1.70 -1.96 -1.78 -2.27 -1.83 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series is a unit root process. An intercept and trend are included in the test equation. 
The lag length was selected by using the Akaike Information Criteria. The critical values are taken from Im, Pesaran, and 
Shin (2003). * Rejects the null at the 10% level (CV–2:39); ** rejects the null at the 5% level (CV–2:46); *** rejects the null 
at the 1% level (CV–2:58). 
Source: Authors. 
 
The panel unit root tests applied previously do not account for cross-sectional 
dependence of the contemporaneous error terms. It has been shown in the literature 
that failing to consider cross-sectional dependence may cause substantial size distor-
tions (see, for example, Anindya Banerjee 1999; Pesaran 2007). To avoid this mis-
performance of the unit root tests we proceed with our panel unit root analysis relax-
ing the assumption of cross-sectional independence, the test proposed by Pesaran 
(2007). The Cross-Sectional Augmented IPS Panel Unit Root Test (CIPS) proposed 
by Pesaran (2007) is a panel fixed effects test allowing for parameter heterogeneity 
and serial correlation between the cross sections, correcting their dependency. 
The CIPS test has been designed for testing the unit root hypothesis when the 
variable under study has a factor structure. The critical values for the CIPS tests are 
given in Tables 2 in Pesaran (2007). 
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Table 2  Pesaran (2007), Cross-Sectional Augmented IPS (CIPS) Test 
 
Series in log-levels lag p=0 p=1 p=2 p=3 
H -2.237 -2.499 -2.468 -2.183 
Y -1.929 -2.197 -1.701 -1.920 
DR65 -1.678 -1.721 -1.501 -1.424 
DR15 -1.349 -1.260 -1.319 -1.314 
IM -2.722 -1.905 -1.761 -1.578 
HPH -2.258 -2.588 -2.130 -1.677 
HPR -2.163 -2.127 -2.003 -2.010 
HPU -2.155 -2.331 -1.962 -2.009 
 
Notes: The null hypothesis is that the series is a unit root process. Critical values for the CIPS test with an intercept and 
trend are: CV–2:89 (10%),  CV–2:68 (5%), and CV–2:84 (1%) (see Pesaran 2007). * Rejects the null at the 10% level; 
** rejects the null at the 5% level; *** rejects the null at the 1% level. 
Source: Authors. 
 
In Table 2 we report the results for the Pesaran Cross-Sectional Augmented 
IPS test. The model used to test the unit root hypothesis is the one with intercept and 
trend. Because our data are annual we test until three lag lengths. The unit root test 
hypothesis is not rejected at the conventional level of significance for the three va-
riables considering a lag length of 2 or 3. These results indicate that variables under 
analysis are integrated of order 1. 
 
3. Cointegration Analysis 
 
In this section we report our cointegration analysis results based on the Peter Pedroni 
(1999, 2001, 2004) cointegration test. Two classes of statistics are considered in the 
context of the Pedroni test. The first type is based on pooling the residuals of the re-
gression along the within-dimension of the panel, whereas the second type is based 
on pooling the residuals of the regression along the between-dimension of the panel. 
For the first type, the test statistics are the panel ߥ-statistic, the panel ߩ-statistic, the 
panel PP-statistic, and the panel ADF-statistic. These statistics are constructed by 
taking the ratio of the sum of the numerators and the sum of the denominators of the 
analogous conventional time-series statistics across the individual members of the 
panel. The tests for the second type include the group ߩ-statistic, the group PP-
statistic, and the group ADF-statistic. They are simply the group mean statistics of 
the conventional individual time-series statistics. All statistics have been standar-
dized by the means and variances so that they are asymptotically distributed N(0,1) 
under the null hypothesis of no cointegration. As one-sided tests, large positive val-
ues of the panel v-statistic reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration. For the re-
maining statistics (the panel ߩ, the panel PP, the panel ADF, the group ߩ, the group 
PP, and the group ADF tests), large negative values reject this null hypothesis. See 
Pedroni (2004) for a detailed discussion. 
The panel cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (2004) is reported in Table 
3. Pedroni (1999) showed that the panel-ADF and group-ADF statistics have better 
small sample properties than the other statistics, and are more reliable as a result. 
Table 3 shows that the panel-ADF and group-ADF statistics significantly reject the 
null hypothesis of no cointegration as given by Equation (1).  
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Table 3  Pedroni (2004), Panel Cointegration Tests 
 
Test the following relation: ܪ௜௧ = ߙ௜ + ߚ௜′ ௜ܺ௧ + ݑ௜௧a
 
Test statisticsb 
Panel -stat 1.127
Panel -stat 4.299
Panel PP-stat -7.539*** 
Panel ADF-stat -7.678*** 
Group -stat 5.469
Group PP-stat -11.265*** 
Group ADF-stat -11.603*** 
Notes: a Where, ௜ܺ௧ contains ௜ܻ௧, ܦܴ௜௧଺ହ, ܦܴ௜௧ଵହ, ܫܯ௜௧, ܪ௜௧௉ு, ܪ௜௧௉ோ, and ܪ௜௧௉௎. We report only the intercept and the trend 
case. b The tests statistics are distributed as  (0,1) under the null of no cointegration. The statistics are constructed using 
small sample adjustment factors from Pedroni (1999, 2004). * Rejects the null at the 10% level; ** rejects the null at the 5% 
level; *** rejects the null at the 1% level. 
Source: Authors.  
 
The cointegration test applied previously does not account for cross sectional 
dependence of the contemporaneous error terms. Now, the cross section augmented 
regression is given by Equation (3) and to estimate parameters Sean Holly, Pesaran, 
and Takashi Yamagata (2010) use the pooled CCE estimator in Pesaran (2006). 
We have computed the CCE test statistics proposed by Banerjee and Carrion-
i-Silvestre (2011) using up to three lags for the autoregressive correction in (13). The 
computation of the cross section augmented ADF cointegration (CADFC) statistic 
gives ܥܣܦܨܥ = −2: 56  when ݌ =  0, ܥܣܦܨܥ =  −2: 98 when ݌ =  1, ܥܣܦܨܥ =
 −2: 93 when ݌ =  2 and ܥܣܦܨܥ =  −3: 29 when ݌ =  3, ݌ being the order of the 
autoregressive correction that is used. When we compare the values of the CADFC 
statistic with the critical values given in Table 4 of Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre 
(2011) for ܰ =  30 and ܶ =  20, we conclude that except for ݌ =  0 and ݌ =  2, 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at the 5% level of significance. We 
also conclude that except for ݌ =  0 the null hypothesis is rejected at the 10% level 
of significance. 
 
4. Estimation of the Long-Run Equilibrium 
 
Our final step is the estimation of the long-run relationships between real per capita 
health expenditure and health expenses financed by government, privately, and spent 
on medications, income, age structure of the population, and technology. Conversely, 
the error correction model (ECM) is suited to estimate the speed at which the depen-
dent variable returns to equilibrium after a change in one of the regressors and it too 
is used to determine bidirectional causality between the variables in the model, and 
we believe that this causality has been well determined in earlier literature that has 
been investigating health-income elasticity (Nancy J. Devlin and Paul Hansen 2001; 
Paul Frijters, John P. Haisken-DeNew, and Michael A. Shields 2005; Erkan Erdil and 
Ibrahim Hakan Yetkiner 2009). Thus, in order to estimate the long-run relationship, 
we had to choose the econometric technique best suited to our panel data characteris-
tics. We begin performing the general diagnostic tests for cross section dependence 
in panels suggested by Pesaran (2004). The hypothesis that there is no cross sectional 
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dependence is rejected. Therefore, we proceed to estimate our panel data model sub-
ject to cross section dependence, as suggested by Pesaran (2006). 
When the cointegration relationship does not account for cross sectional de-
pendence of the contemporaneous error terms, it has been shown in the literature that 
failing to consider cross sectional dependence may cause substantial size distortions 
(see, for example, O’Connell 1998; Pesaran 2007). We performed the general diag-
nostic tests for cross section dependence in panels suggested by Pesaran (2004) as 
shown in Table 4. The hypothesis that there is no cross sectional dependence is re-
jected. Therefore, we proceed to estimate our panel data model subject to error cross 
section dependence, as suggested by Pesaran (2006). The Pesaran’s (2006) Monte 
Carlo simulations show that common correlated effects - Pesaran (2006) pooled es-
timator (CCE-PPE) has satisfactory small sample properties. Pesaran’s (2006) Monte 
Carlo simulations also showed that the mean group estimators (CCE-PMG) have sa-
tisfactory properties when N and T are relatively large. 
Table 4 shows that when removing the cross dependency, real per capita 
health care expenditure clearly increases with health care expenditure financed by 
government. Health care expenditure also increases with income per capita, with the 
elderly and young dependents on the society, with the advances in technology, and 
with health care expenditure financed privately and with medication expenses. Culy-
er (1988) suggests that the luxury good view of health care may be based on a miss-
pecification of the determinants of health, with the possibility of omitted variables as 
a cause of the misspecification. Our pooled results show that when government ex-
penditure on health, the age structure of the population, and technological progress 
have been included in the estimation, the ability to pay becomes a less important de-
terminant of health expenditure. 
 
Table 4  CCE-PPE Panel Estimates of the Cointegration Relationship: ܪ௜௧ = ߚ௜ᇱ ௜ܺ௧ + ݑ௜௧ 
 
 ௜ܻ௧ ܦܴ௜௧ଵହ ܦܴ௜௧଺ହ ܫܯ௜௧ ܪ௜௧௉ு ܪ௜௧௉ோ ܪ௜௧௉௎ 
Fixed effects estimates 0.057 0.174 0.082 0.005 0.044* 0.095*** 0.668*** 
t-stat in brackets (0.963) (1.488) (0.586) (0.219) (1.746) (4.506) (13.604) 
CD test statistica 5.408       
Pesaran’s (2006) CCE pooled estimatesb 0.066 0.284** 0.227* 0.029 0.056** 0.090*** 0.651*** 
t-stat in brackets (1.148) (2.426) (1.596) (1.003) (2.532) (3.948) (12.833) 
 
Notes: a Pesaran’s (2004) General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Dependence (residuals). b CCE Pooled Estimator is 
defined by Equation (65) and t-stat is the associated t-ratio of the standard error based on Newey-West type variance esti-
mator of Equation (74) in Pesaran (2006). * Rejects the null at the 10% level; ** rejects the null at the 5% level; *** rejects 
the null at the 1% level. 
Source: Authors. 
 
Health care expenditure financed by government explains around 65% of the 
increase in health expenses, the out of pocket health care expenses explain 9%, and 
the expenses on pharmaceutical goods explains 5.6% of the variations in the real per 
capita health care expenditure. Similar to Leu (1986), Culyer (1988), and Hitiris and 
Posnett (1992), we claim that the extent to which health care expenditure is financed 
by the government has a positive effect on health care spending. We also claim that 
the importance of the income variable fades away at the expense of the health care 
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expenditure financed by the government, privately, and expenditures on medications. 
In a comparable study developed for the United States, Moscone and Tosetti (2010) 
achieved a similar result when controlling for other non-income determinants of 
health expenditure. They concluded that while the ability to pay is a determinant of 
health care spending, the existence of publicly financed programs weakens the link 
between income and the standard of care. Our results corroborate this argument, as 
the estimated coefficient of the income variable is not statistically significant. Thus, 
public intervention, public funding, and health insurance make the demand for health 
care independent of an individual’s income. Technology progress is found to be not 
statistically significant in explaining health expenses. As did Gerdtham et al. (1998), 
we found a positive effect of youth dependency rate on health care expenditures. In 
our sample youth dependency rate explains around 28%, while the old-dependency 
explains around 23% of the increase in health expenses. This result supports the ar-
gument of the tendency for health expenditures per capita to increase with age (Oli-
veira Martins and De la Maisonneuve 2006; Josifidis et al. 2011). 
Table 5 has the estimation results for each individual country. Regarding indi-
vidual country estimators, we find that the estimation results for the determinants of 
health expenditure in the OECD vary considerably across countries, which validates 
the microeconometric methodology followed in this article. By including a factor 
structure in the econometric specification to consider advances in medical care tech-
nology, policy shifts, new diseases, and shifts in preferences and expectations by us-
ers of health services, it allows for these external effects to have different influences 
on each country. Similar to the pooled estimate, health care expenditure financed by 
government explains around 65% of the variations in the real per capita health care 
expenditure in Austria, Greece and New Zealand. With respect to private health care 
expenses, we have Australia, Austria, Czech Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
and United Kingdom with an estimated coefficient around 9% similar to the pooled 
estimate. As with the pooled estimates, expenses on pharmaceutical goods explain 
around 6% of the variations in the real per capita health care expenditure in Austral-
ia, France, Hungary, Iceland, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland, and United 
States. Conversely to the pooled estimates, we have significant and positive estima-
tors for technology progress in Austria, Czech Republic, France, Iceland, Mexico, 
and Poland. The elderly dependency rate is both positive and significant in Belgium, 
Hungary, Mexico, Poland and Slovak Republic. In our sample, youth dependency 
rate is positive and significant in European countries: Austria, Finland, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, Turkey, and United Kingdom. 
 
Table 5  CCE-PPE Individual Estimates of the Cointegration Relationship: ܪ௜௧ = ߚ௜′ ௜ܺ௧ + ݑ௜௧ 
CCE Estimator for each Countrya 
 
 ௜ܻ௧ ܦݎ௜௧ଵହ ܦܴ௜௧଺ହ ܫܯ௜௧ ܪ௜௧௉ு ܪ௜௧௉ோ ܪ௜௧௉௎ 
Australia 0.29*** 0.136 -0.008 0.019 0.109*** 0.079*** 0.189*** 
 (2.64) (0.54) (-0.07) (1.06) (4.54) (2.93) (2.91) 
Austria 0.103 0.687*** 0.114 0.047*** -0.006 0.098** 0.676*** 
 (1.07) (5.59) (0.86) (3.92) (-0.19) (2.18) (10.73) 
Belgium 0.154 -1.755** 2.634*** 0.081 -0.111 0.435*** -0.100 
 (0.41) (-2.19) (3.81) (1.25) (-0.75) (3.57) (-1.30) 
Canada -0.125*** -0.007 -0.426*** -0.062*** -0.015 0.19*** 0.806*** 
 (-3.68) (-0.06) (-2.58) (-3.10) (-0.23) (7.31) (20.15) 
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Czech Republic 0.27*** -1.342*** -0.69* 0.091*** -0.094* 0.076*** 0.941*** 
 (4.36) (-3.48) (-1.73) (2.76) (-1.65) (3.62) (22.95) 
Denmark 0.061 -0.397** -0.81*** -0.01 -0.093*** 0.231*** 1.052*** 
 (0.60) (-2.32) (-3.05) (-0.44) (-3.72) (6.24) (5.13) 
Finland 0.033 0.607* -0.332* -0.025 -0.048 0.198*** 0.819*** 
 (1.22) (1.75) (-1.71) (-1.32) (-0.65) (2.79) (16.71) 
France 0.000 0.412*** -0.08 0.026** 0.04* 0.047*** 0.811*** 
 (0.00) (4.63) (-1.04) (2.00) (1.82) (3.62) (45.06) 
Germany 0.115 -0.969 -0.556 0.021 -0.092 -0.072 0.385** 
 (0.73) (-1.25) (-0.69) (0.15) (-1.17) (-0.73) (2.29) 
Greece 0.046 0.151 -1.584*** -0.009 0.14*** 0.26*** 0.603*** 
 (0.56) (1.58) (-6.47) (-0.69) (6.67) (23.64) (15.87) 
Hungary -0.105 5.103*** 5.094*** -0.18*** 0.118*** 0.368*** 1.029*** 
 (-0.81) (7.48) (3.70) (-3.67) (4.72) (10.51) (14.49) 
Iceland 0.043 -0.015 0.061 0.015*** 0.041*** 0.157*** 0.777*** 
 (1.54) (-0.13) (0.73) (2.50) (4.10) (39.25) (40.89) 
Ireland -0.36*** -0.466* 0.063 -0.042 0.143** -0.046 0.866*** 
 (-3.50) (-1.69) (0.24) (-1.27) (2.01) (-1.15) (7.53) 
Italy 0.106 0.129 -0.099 -0.013 0.009 0.208*** 0.732*** 
 (1.26) (0.92) (-0.51) (-0.43) (0.22) (3.92) (13.56) 
Japan 0.397*** -0.848* 0.603 -0.146** -0.006 -0.033 0.295*** 
 (3.48) (-1.70) (1.21) (-2.09) (-0.13) (-0.61) (2.73) 
Korea 0.071 -0.065 -0.143 -0.137* -0.174 0.747*** 0.463*** 
 (1.01) (-0.18) (-0.42) (-1.85) (-1.18) (5.49) (8.74) 
Luxembourg -1.321** 4.313*** 2.993 -0.076 -0.194 -0.108 1.103*** 
 (-2.15) (2.92) (0.80) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-1.05) (3.09) 
Mexico 0.028*** 0.027 0.054*** 0.023*** -0.007*** 0.547*** 0.435*** 
 (3.50) (0.63) (2.57) (3.83) (-3.50) (54.70) (87.00) 
Netherlands -0.561** -2.181*** -0.785 -0.079 0.053 0.097*** 0.145 
 (-2.41) (-2.96) (-0.87) (-0.75) (0.22) (3.35) (0.87) 
New Zealand -0.022 0.066 -0.073 -0.039* 0.173*** 0.09** 0.669*** 
 (-0.39) (0.61) (-0.66) (-1.86) (5.41) (1.96) (13.12) 
Norway -0.055*** -0.866*** -1.281*** 0.04* 0.01 0.165*** 0.892*** 
 (-5.00) (-4.35) (-5.14) (1.91) (0.53) (5.89) (15.93) 
Poland 0.608*** -2.426*** 1.316** -0.093 0.178 0.213*** 0.93*** 
 (4.90) (-3.33) (2.31) (-1.12) (0.98) (11.21) (5.78) 
Portugal -0.004 0.531 0.593 -0.066 0.621*** 0.002 0.357*** 
 (-0.02) (1.12) (0.98) (-0.47) (5.05) (0.14) (3.16) 
Slovak Republic 0.238*** 1.722*** 0.716*** -0.079** 0.058*** 0.215*** 0.814*** 
 (2.74) (2.90) (4.12) (-2.08) (6.45) (13.44) (14.03) 
Spain -0.166** -0.452*** -0.325** 0.122 0.102* -0.002 0.732*** 
 (-2.34) (-6.46) (-2.52) (1.42) (1.89) (-0.50) (8.61) 
Sweden 0.007 1.677*** 0.045 -0.003 -0.034 -0.558* 0.941*** 
 (0.06) (2.34) (0.12) (-0.12) (-0.35) (-1.83) (6.23) 
Switzerland 0.153*** -0.452** -1.349*** -0.003 0.118* 0.24*** 0.713*** 
 (3.12) (-1.97) (-2.47) (-0.16) (1.67) (3.75) (19.81) 
Turkey -0.267 5.698*** -0.061 -0.206*** 0.29*** 0.364*** 1.182*** 
 (-1.32) (2.80) (-0.11) (-3.49) (5.58) (4.18) (18.76) 
United Kingdom 0.358*** 0.401*** 0.272 0.01 -0.11*** 0.106*** 0.922*** 
 (3.85) (2.57) (1.28) (0.25) (-3.44) (2.65) (12.46) 
United States 0.096*** -0.091 0.093 -0.074 0.134*** 0.408*** 0.764*** 
 (3.84) (-0.25) (0.35) (-0.90) (3.35) (8.00) (12.32) 
 
Notes: A CCE Estimator for a Country is defined by Equation (26) and the corresponding t-stat associated to the standard 
error based on Newey-West type variance estimator of Equation (50) in Pesaran (2006) (t-stat in brackets). * Rejects the 
null at the 10% level; ** rejects the null at the 5% level; *** rejects the null at the 1% level. 
Source: Author. 
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The income elasticity is found to be significant and considerably smaller than 
the one in Australia, Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Slovak Republic, Switzerland, 
United Kingdom, and United States. Furthermore, in Canada, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Norway, and Spain, health care appears as an inferior good, since the 
public funding as well as health insurance make demand for health care inversely 
related to an individual’s income. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper analyzes the long-run economic relationship between health care expendi-
ture and a set of determinants of health expenditure in the OECD countries. Using a 
panel of 30 OECD countries over the period from 1990 to 2009, we have studied the 
non-stationarity and cointegration properties of health care spending and its sources 
of funding, income, and non-income variables. Our analysis indicates that health care 
expenditure, the different sources of health expenditure funding computed over total 
health care expenditure: public, private, and expenditures on medicines, income per 
capita, the dependency rates of the population, and technological progress are non-
stationary, and that they are linked in the long run. Our empirical study finds that to a 
large extent health care spending is independent of an individual’s income. We also 
detect a significant cross-country dependence, which justifies the inclusion of factor 
structure that synthesizes the effects of shocks that may hit health spending, such as 
advances in medical care technology, policy shifts, new diseases, and shifts in prefe-
rences and expectations by users of health services.  
Our results show that when health care expenditure is mainly financed by 
government it weakens the estimated coefficient for the income variable, controlling 
for dependency rates for old and young age structure and technological progress. The 
weight of the income therefore dilutes when controlling for the way health care ex-
penses are financed, as well as other non-income determinants of health expenditure. 
As for non-income determinants, the percentage of young and elderly people reveals 
a significant and positive impact on health care expenditures. Health care spending 
increases with both youth and, the elderly. The policy implications of these results 
are of great importance since health care expenditures in industrial countries have 
been growing rapidly over the past years. This rapid growth jeopardizes the sustaina-
bility of public budgets and causes an increasing interest in the determinants of 
health care expenditures. 
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Appendix 
 
Data 
 
Our empirical work uses annual data on 30 OECD countries from 1989 to 2009 
(ܶ =  20), gathered from the OECD Data Set. We collected information on per capi-
ta total health care expenditure and per capita income estimated in GDP purchasing 
power parity, and expressed in US dollars. We also gathered data for the following 
variables that have been identified by the literature as having a role in determining 
health care expenditure taken from OECD Health Database: the dependency rates for 
old and young people, defined as the population aged over 65 and under 15, respec-
tively; the infant mortality rate; the public expenditure on health care computed as 
government expenditure over total health care expenditure; private expenditure com-
puted as out of pocket expenditure on health over total health care expenditure; and 
the pharmaceutical expenditure computed as expenses on medicines over total health 
care expenditure. 
 
Data Sources 
 
From the OECD Database, it was obtained for the period 1990-2009: 
 
ܪ:  Total health expenditure per capita, US dollars, purchasing power 
parity (PPP). 
ܻ:  GDP per capita, US dollars, current prices and purchasing power 
parity (PPP). 
ܦܴ଺ହ: Dependency rate as the ratio of population aged 65 and over as 
percentage of total population. 
ܦܴଵହ: Dependency rate as the ratio of population aged less than 15 as a 
percentage of total population. 
ܫܯ:  Infant mortality: deaths per 1000 live births. 
ܪ௉ு:  Pharmaceutical expenditure computed as expenditure on medicines 
over total health care expenditure. 
ܪ௉ோ:  Private health expenditure computed as out of pocket expenditure 
over total health care expenditure. 
ܪ௉௎:  Public health expenditure computed as government expenditure over 
total health care expenditure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
